

13001  
28 Apr  
TOP SECRET

OBOE SIX

NOTES ON DIVISIONAL COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE FOR ISSUE OF OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR OBOE SIX, AT PLANNING HQ 9 AUST DIV 270930I

1. Present

GOC

Comd and BM 20 Aust Inf Bde

Comd and BM 24 Aust Inf Bde

Comd and DAQMG 1 Aust Beach Gp

9 Aust Div Planning Staff

Naval Planning Team

Reps Air Force Planning Team

S3 727 Amphibian Tractor Bn

CO 593 Engr Boat and Shore Regt

2. GOC delivered Outline Plan for operation OBOE SIX covering the following :-

(a) Discipline

The discipline of troops at BRUNEI especially in relation to the local native women must be strictly enforced so as to uphold the name of the Allies and NOT to antagonise the local population.

(b) GOC stressed that operation OBOE SIX was a coordinated divisional operation and NOT a series of independent brigade tasks which necessitated all planning being coordinated by division.

(c) Outline of 9 Aust Div Task

(i) To control the BRUNEI area from PAPAR RIVER in the NORTH to MIRI in the SOUTH.

(ii) Safeguard rubber interests and oil facilities in the area.

(d) Topography

(i) Land movement on the southern and south eastern shores of BRUNEI BAY is almost impossible.

(ii) Swamp areas, road, track and railway systems were outlined.

(iii) Many of the rivers in the area are navigable for a certain distance.

(iv) A road extends from BRUNEI to TUTONG and from TUTONG to MIRI it is possible for vehicles to move along the beach below half tide.

(e) Weather

(i) Prevailing wind is from the south west.

(ii) After June, odd showers occur but the weather is reasonably fine.

(iii) Gales are common in the area south west of LABUAN ISLAND and last for several days at a time, but to the NORTH of LABUAN ISLAND, gales are much less common and sheltered anchorages for craft are always available.

(f) Survey

The hachuring shown on maps to the EAST of BRUNEI BAY is most inaccurate.

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- (g) The nature of the country and the operation render it essential that re-supply and tactical movement of troops be mainly carried out by water transport. Extra small craft have therefore been asked for.

(h) Enemy

The latest dispositions and movements of enemy in northern BORNEO were outlined. As the main enemy forces are to the NORTH of our objective area, the main threat of enemy counter measures must be from this direction.

- (j) (i) Outline of 9 Aust Div force for the operation.

(ii) Carrier based aircraft are NOT available for direct support but will be bombing strategic targets in the general area.

(k) Naval support available for bombardment

(i) Z Day - 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers, adequate support ships.

(ii) Subsequently some naval units will be remaining in the objective area for a period for naval support.

(l) Air

Certain aerial bombing targets have been arranged. A programme of intensification towards Z day would be arranged.

(m) LVTs

Extra LVTs have been asked for. All LVTs used in OBOE SIX must be returned to MOROTAI by 11 June.

(n) ESB craft

As the operation develops, the divisional front will extend for up to 180 miles. This, in conjunction with terrain, dictates a large amount of re-supply and movement by sea. To this end, LCMS and LOTS have been requested.

(o) Outline of plan

(i) Simultaneous landings by two assault brigades -

24 Aust Inf Bde Gp - BROWN BEACH

20 Aust Inf Bde Gp - GREEN and RED BEACHES.

(ii) Brigade tasks were outlined.

(iii) Navy prefer to neutralise HAMILTON POINT by air and naval bombardment for approximately 1 hour. After this, a landing on BLUE BEACH could be made if desired.

(iv) Composition of brigade groups outlined.

(p) AA and engineer tasks outlined.

(q) Z Day 23 May 45. Sea voyage approximately 7 days, therefore there are less than three weeks for both planning and embarkation.

(r) It was pointed out that the divisional reserve battalion and the reserve battalion of 20 Aust Inf Bde must be prepared to land on any beach if necessary. These battalions must therefore be tactically loaded to enable them to make the assault landing. When brigade objectives are secured, the maximum number of

troops must be brought into reserve to be rested and prepared immediately for subsequent operations.

(s) LVTs

(i) The Navy regard the landing of LVTs on GREEN BEACH as hazardous, therefore LCVPs must be planned for use on this beach.

(ii) It may be possible to retain one platoon of LVTs in the objective area after 11 June.

(t) LCMs in the 593 EB and SR have 4 x .50 calibre MGs mounted for firing forward.

3. It is a Naval responsibility for marking the channel past MURARA ISLAND, but details as to the means by which it is carried out must be decided in detailed planning.
4. The GOC pointed out the basis to be used by brigades etc in slimming down vehicles and stores for the assault and follow up convoys. Brigades etc will re-consider the figures considered and ensure that new figures contain only essential personnel, vehicles and stores for the operation.

DISTRIBUTION

List 'Z'

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